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Britain’s unexpected vote to leave the European Union (Brexit) in June 2016 has proved
divisive and damaging both within the United Kingdom and internationally. Across two
correlational studies, the current research proposed a model to explain the Brexit vote,
with attitudes to immigration andwillingness to disagree (WD) as direct predictors of the
referendum result, and internal (IMS) and external (EMS) motivation to respond without
prejudice as indirect predictors. Study 1 (N = 353) and Study 2 (N = 363) both showed
good fit with the model and, respectively, explained 48% and 46% of the referendum
result. More positive attitudes to immigration predicted a vote to remain. Higher IMS and
lower EMS predicted a vote to remain, fullymediated by attitudes to immigration. In Study
1, lowerWD also predicted a vote to remain, both directly and indirectly via attitudes to
immigration, although this was not replicated in Study 2. These results are discussed both
in relation to the Brexit result, and the implications for motivation to respond without
prejudice, WD, and political correctness more generally.
Following an acrimonious campaign, the United Kingdom (UK) decided to leave the
European Union (EU) in a referendum on 23 June 2016 by the narrow margin of 51.9%
voting leave (Leavers) against 48.1% voting remain (Remainers) on a turnout of 72% (The
Electoral Commission, 2018). This largely unexpected result (BBC News, 2016;
Greenslade, 2016) has proved to be one of the most divisive events of recent British
history with potentially substantial economic and political impacts not just in the United
Kingdombut across the EU (Bulmer&Quaglia, 2018; Chen et al., 2018). Togetherwith the
election of Donald Trump as US President and the growth of right-wing populist parties in
Europe (Greven, 2016; Lewis, Clarke, Barr, Holder, &Kommenda, 2018), the UK’s vote to
leave the EU (Brexit) has also been seen as part of a wider backlash across Western
democracies against globalism and the post-war liberal consensus (Inglehart & Norris,
2016). Understanding the causes of Brexit, therefore, has assumed a broader significance
than simply domestic politics in Britain.
The Brexit result has been analysed from a number of perspectives: the demographic
profile of Leavers and Remainers (Becker, Fetzer, &Novy, 2017; Goodwin&Heath, 2016),
the key economic and political issues underlying the vote (Arnorsson & Zoega, 2016;
Clarke, Goodwin, & Whiteley, 2017), distrust of politicians, experts, and the political
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establishment (Abrams&Travaglino, 2018; Hobolt, 2016; IpsosMORI, 2016), and the role
of the media and social media (Cushion & Lewis, 2017; Del Vicario, Zollo, & Caldarelli,
2016). Areas with the highest Leave vote were characterized by economic disadvantage,
low average levels of education, and an older,White, working class population (Goodwin
& Heath, 2016). Hobolt (2016) concluded that the Leave vote was motivated by anti-
establishment and anti-immigration sentiments, fuelled by lack of economic opportunities
and anger with the political class. Whilst the impact of immigration in the EU referendum
vote has beenwidely acknowledged, the current research adds to the existing literatureby
exploring the role ofmotivation to respondwithout prejudice andwillingness to disagree
(WD).
Analysis of the referendum results revealed some stark socio-demographic divisions
across the UK population (YouGov, 2016; N = 5,455). Amongst 18- to 24-year-olds, 71%
voted to remain, comparedwith just 36% of those over 65. Of thosewhose highest level of
education was GCSEs (General Certificate of Secondary Education; examinations
normally taken at age 15–16 years), just 30% voted to remain compared with 68% of
those with a university degree. By political orientation, 65% of those voting Labour and
68% of those voting Liberal in the 2015 UK General Election voted to remain compared
with just 5% of those voting for the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and 39% of those
voting Conservative. There was less of a split by gender with 47% of men and 49% of
women voting Remain. The current research controlled for these socio-demographic
variables in order to isolate the underlying effects of the psychological and attitudinal
variables that contributed to the Brexit result.
Attitudes to immigration and Brexit
Concern in the United Kingdom over immigration was building in the years leading up to
the referendum. Net immigration to the United Kingdom accelerated dramatically after
the accession of eight newEastern Europeanmembers to the EU in 2004 (ONS, 2016;Watt
& Wintour, 2015). More than 60% of British adults thought that the level of immigration
had a negative effect on Britain, compared with less than 20%who thought it was positive
(Ashcroft, 2013, N = 20,062; YouGov, 2012, N = 1,715). Public concern over immigra-
tion fuelled the rise of the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and persuaded Prime Minister
David Cameron to promise a simple in–out referendum on EU membership should the
Conservatives win the general election in 2015 (Mason, 2016). In a national poll
immediately after the referendum, 33% of Leave voters cited ‘regaining control over
immigration’ as their main motivation (Ashcroft, 2016, N = 12,369). Subsequent studies
have confirmed that the threat of immigration predicted voting behaviour in the EU
referendum (Abrams & Travaglino, 2018; Golec de Zavala, Guerra, & Simao, 2017).
Meleady, Seger, and Vermue (2017) demonstrated that more positive and less negative
contact by UK voters with (European) immigrants predicted more positive attitudes to
immigration which in turn predicted an intention to vote Remain. Consistent with this
research, we hypothesized that more positive attitudes to immigration would predict a
vote to remain.
Motivation to respond without prejudice and attitudes to immigration
The concept of motivation to respond without prejudice was developed in response to
the decline in explicit measures of racial prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998). Traditionally,
racism has reflected the belief that minority ethnic groups are biologically, intellectually,
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or culturally inferior as a justification for prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory
behaviour (Duckitt, 1992). However, whilst studies increasingly indicated a reduction in
explicit expressions of racial prejudice (McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981; Schuman,
Steeh, & Bobo, 1985), psychologists asserted that racism had not gone away, merely gone
underground (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996). Plant and
Devine (1998) sought to understand the motivations that led people to suppress explicit
racial prejudice. They identified a distinction between external motivation to respond
without prejudice, driven by a desire to avoid social sanction for what had become
normatively unacceptable views, and internal motivation where the desire to respond
without prejudice had been internalized into the individuals’ personal values. They
developed and validated their External Motivation Scale (EMS) and Internal Motivation
Scale (IMS) to measure these constructs. Whilst Golec de Zavala et al. (2017) explicitly
associated measures of individual prejudice with the EU referendum vote, no research so
far has tested the role of motivation to respond without prejudice in the result.
The growth in immigration in the 21st century (Hamilton, Medianu, & Esses, 2013) has
been paralleled by increasing levels of anti-immigrant attitudes (Markaki & Longhi, 2013)
that conflict with an anti-prejudice norm that is also prevalent across Western Europe
(Ivarsflaten, Blinder, & Ford, 2010). Reflecting this dissonance, Blinder, Ford, and
Ivarsflaten (2013) found that motivation to respond without prejudice is a key influence
on political choices where outgroups are prominent. They found that higher IMS
correlatedwith greater support for equal treatment of asylum seekers and less opposition
to Islamic schools. This suggests that motivation to respond without prejudice might also
have been a key variable in the EU referendum result. We hypothesized that higher IMS
would predict more positive attitudes to immigration which would in turn predict a
Remain vote.
Blinder et al. (2013) only examined the effect of IMS and disregarded EMS on the
grounds that social pressures would be less relevant in the privacy of the ballot box.
However, Plant and Devine (1998) demonstrated that IMS and EMS were discrete
constructs and found a small inverse relationship between them (average r = .14,
p < .001) that has been replicated in subsequent studies (Klonis, Plant, & Devine, 2005;
Ratcliff, Lassiter, Markman, & Snyder, 2006). Plant and Devine (1998) found that IMS was
positively associated with the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, 1983) and the Attitude
Toward Blacks Scale (Brigham, 1993), whilst EMS was negatively associated with these
measures. Externally motivated participants also scored more highly on implicit racial
prejudice than those who were internally motivated (Devine, Plant, & Amodio, 2002;
Hausmann&Ryan, 2004). These studies suggest that EMSmight also have an independent
and opposite effect to IMS on attitudes to immigration. We hypothesized therefore that
that lower EMS would predict more positive attitudes to immigration.
Political correctness, willingness to disagree, and Brexit
Plant and Devine (1998) suggested that motivation to respond without prejudice was
linked to the idea of political correctness (PC). They used non-adherence to prevailing
college PC standards to validate their measures of IMS and EMS (Plant & Devine, 1998;
studies 2 & 3). They suggested that EMS arose out of a growing anti-prejudice norm that
was exemplified by PC standards. They established that there was an interaction between
IMS and EMS in the way that participants reacted to what they termed ‘politically correct
pressure’ (Plant & Devine, 2001, p. 490). Specifically, those who were both low IMS and
high EMS were particularly likely to feel resentful of pressure to express positive views
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towards Black people.We hypothesized that PCwould vary directly with EMS, but only at
low levels of IMS.
Political correctness has become an increasingly salient theme in Western politics. In
the United Kingdom, 66% (Singh, 2018) and in the United States, 80% (Hawkins, Yudkin,
Juan-Torres, & Dixon, 2018) of adults agree that PC ‘has gone too far’. Populist politicians
have exploited the widespread concern about PC to strengthen their appeal (Greven,
2016). Anti-PC sentiment was an important factor in the election of Donald Trump as US
President in 2016; in an experimental study, Conway, Repke, and Houck (2017) showed
that priming moderate US voters with politically correct stimulus actually increased
support for Trump. In the run-up to the UK’s EU referendum, the Express claimed that
Leave voters felt ‘bullied and unable to express their true feelings in the EU debate’
because a culture of PC by the Remain campaign labelled discussion of immigration as
racist (Maddox, 2016). The Guardian, on the other hand, defended PC (Ellen, 2016),
claimed that it was a ‘phantom enemy’ invented by the Right (Weigel, 2016) and sought to
re-brand it as ‘political politeness’ (Alibhai-Brown, 2016). Reflecting these opposing
perspectives during the campaign, we hypothesized that high PCwould predict a Remain
vote in the EU referendum.
As far aswe are aware, no previous research has directly explored the association of PC
with attitudes to immigration. However, higher PC has been associated with lower right-
wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO; Dickson, 2017)
which have both been associatedwithmore positive attitudes to immigration (Aichholzer
& Zandonella, 2016; Esses, Hodson, & Dovidio, 2003). Lower RWA and SDO have also
been associated with a Remain vote in the EU referendum, mediated by the perceived
threat from immigration (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017). We hypothesized, therefore, that
higher PC would predict more positive attitudes to immigration and that attitudes to
immigration would mediate the relationship between PC and the EU referendum vote.
A search for ‘political correctness’ on PsychINFO revealed nine potential measures of
the construct. These adopted a range of different approaches to the definition and
measurement of PC. Three were conference papers or posters for which we have been
unable to track down the full transcripts (Brittan-Powell, 2000, 2001; Brittan-Powell,
Bashshur, Pak, & Meyenburg, 1999). As Dickson (2017) emphasized, what is considered
PC varies across time and between cultures, but all nine measures were developed and
validated inNorth America and three are now somewhat outdated (Barker, 1994; Lalonde,
Doan, & Patterson, 2000; Suedfeld, Steel, & Schmidt, 1994). Two recent measures,
Andary-Brophy (2015) with 38 items and Dickson (2017) which required respondents to
review 108 matched pairs of words, were not suitable for a short online questionnaire.
The final measure (Strauts & Blanton, 2015), whilst only nine items, includes repeated
references to PC which may result in a social desirability bias.
Reflecting these theoretical and practical issues, we selected four items from Dunton
and Fazio’s (1997)Motivation toControl Prejudiced Reactions Scale (e.g., ‘I think it’smore
important to speak one’s mind than worry about offending someone’), the wording of
which remained culturally relevant to the United Kingdom in 2017. These were originally
developed to reflect an individual’s ‘willingness to restrain from expressing thoughts,
feelings and opinions that might offend others’ (Dunton& Fazio, 1997, p. 318) and, in our
view, represented a reasonable surrogate measure of PC. Nevertheless, reflecting the fact
that these items have not been subject to any formal construct validation procedures, nor
been used previously in this context, we have instead named the measure willingness to
disagree (WD) throughout the current paper.
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The current research
Across two studies, we tested a model that incorporated both proximal and distal
predictors of the EU referendum result as shown in Figure 1. Immigration was a key issue
in the referendum campaign, and several studies have already established that more
positive attitudes to immigration predicted a vote to remain (Abrams & Travaglino, 2018;
Golec de Zavala et al., 2017;Meleady et al., 2017). Following Blinder et al.’s (2013) finding
that IMS was a key underlying influence in political choices where outgroups (such as
immigrants) were salient, we hypothesized that high IMS would predict a Remain vote
mediated by attitudes to immigration. Since Plant and Devine (1998) established that
motivation to respond without prejudice had two discrete but inversely correlated
components, internal and external, we hypothesized that EMS might also have an
independent but opposite impact on the referendum result such that low EMS would
predict aRemain vote, againmediated by attitudes to immigration. Accusations of PCwere
also prominent in the referendum campaign, with Leavers claiming that Remainers were
trying to censor a legitimate debate over immigration. Plant and Devine (2001) showed
that a combination of low IMS and high EMS could produce a backlash against politically
correct pressure. Accordingly, we hypothesized that the interaction of IMS and EMS
would predict our measure of willingness to disagree (WD; in effect a determination to
resist suchpressure),which in turnwould impact the referendumresult, bothdirectly and
mediated by attitudes to immigration, such that lower WD would predict a Remain vote.
This is the first study to test the role of IMS, EMS, and WD in the EU referendum result.
STUDY 1
Method
The questionnaires and SPSS data files for both studies are available on OSF (Dataset,
2020).
Figure 1. Path diagram illustrating hypothesized model of the effects of internal motivation to respond
without prejudice, external motivation to respond without prejudice, willingness to disagree, and
attitudes to immigration on the EU referendum vote.
Notes. Higher scores indicate higher internal motivation to respond without prejudice, higher external
motivation to respond without prejudice, greater willingness to disagree, and more positive attitudes to
immigration (scale 1–7). EU referendum vote; 1 = Leave, 2 = Remain.
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Participants
Participants were recruited online via social media and through Prolific, a research
participant panel, during the autumn of 2017. Of the 432 participants who completed
the questionnaire, 79 were excluded because they did not vote in the EU referendum.
The final sample was 353 participants (183 women; 169 men; 1 ‘prefer not to say’) of
whom 151 voted Leave and 202 voted Remain. Age ranged from 18 to 84 years
(M = 40, SD = 14.3). Of the final sample, 88 were recruited via social media and 265
via Prolific.
The sample size reflected something of a compromise. It comfortably exceeded the
minimum size of 104 + 8 (the number of predictor variables) required to detect amedium
effect size for a multiple regression (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014). However, SEM is a large
sample technique (Byrne, 2009). Kline (2016) offered a heuristic for calculating the
necessary sample at between 109 and 209 the number of free parameters. In the case of
our hypothesized model, there were 75 parameters to be estimated implying a sample of
750–1,500. However, most SEM studies use much smaller samples; a review of 74 studies
by Westland (2010) indicated a mean sample size of 375.
Design
This was a correlational design with IMS, EMS, WD, and attitudes to immigration as
predictor variables and EU referendumvote as the outcome variable. Additionally, gender,
age, level of education, and political orientation were used as control variables.
Procedure and materials
Participants completed an online questionnaire, hosted by Qualtrics, entitled ‘Perspec-
tives on Immigration’. After giving their informed consent, they were asked how they
voted in the UK General Election in July 2017 and in the UK referendum on EU
membership in 2016. Theywere then asked to give their views across 12 itemsmeasuring
IMS, EMS, andWD, and their attitudes to immigration across six items, all randomized, and
followed by a range of socio-demographic questions. Finally, they were thanked and
debriefed.
Measures
Internalmotivation and externalmotivation to respondwithout prejudiceweremeasured
with 7-point Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree) using items from
Plant and Devine’s (1998) Internal Motivation Score (IMS) and External Motivation Score
(EMS), respectively. In an effort to keep the questionnaire as short as practical and
reflecting the fact that items from Plant and Devine’s (1998) original scales sometimes
appeared very similar, we used four items from each scale. Thesewere adapted to reflect a
generalizedmotivation to respond without prejudice, rather than a specific motivation to
respond without racial prejudice against Black people. IMS was measured with the
following four items (a = .78): ‘I attempt to act in non-prejudiced ways towards other
people because it is personally important to me’, ‘According to my personal values, using
stereotypes about other people isOK’ (reversed), ‘I ampersonallymotivated bymybeliefs
to be non-prejudiced towards other people’, and ‘Being non-prejudiced towards other
people is important to my self-concept’. EMS wasmeasured with the following four items
(a = .75): ‘I attempt to appear non-prejudiced towards other people in order to avoid
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disapproval fromothers’, ‘I try to hide any negative feelings about other people in order to
avoid negative reactions from others’, ‘Because of today’s politically correct standards, I
try to appear non-prejudiced towards other people’, and ‘I try to act non-prejudiced
towards other people because of pressure from others’. Higher scores indicate higher
levels of IMS and EMS.
Willingness to disagree was measured with 7-point Likert scales (1 = strongly
disagree; 7 = strongly agree) using the following four items (a = .76) from the
Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale (Dunton & Fazio, 1997): ‘I always
express my thoughts and feelings regardless of how controversial they may be’, ‘Going
through life worried about whether you might offend someone is just more trouble than
it’s worth’, ‘I think it’s more important to speak one’s mind than worry about offending
someone’, and ‘I’m not afraid to tell someone what I think even when they disagree with
me’. These items reflect individual commitment to resist self-censorship despite the risk of
social disapproval and were combined to create aWD scale with higher scores indicating
higher levels of WD.
Attitudes to immigration were measured using the following six items (a = .93)
taken from the European Social Survey (2002) on 7-point Likert scales: ‘Is Britain made
a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?
(1 = worse, 7 = better), ‘Would you say it was generally bad or good for the economy
that people come here to live from other countries?’ (1 = bad, 7 = good), ‘Would you
say that people who come here to live generally take jobs away from workers in
Britain, or generally help to create new jobs?’ (1 = take jobs away, 7 = create new
jobs), ‘On balance do you think people who come here to live take out more than they
put in or put in more than they take out?’ (1 = take out more, 7 = put in more), ‘Are
Britain’s crime problems made worse or better by people coming to live here from
other countries?’ (1 = better, 7 = worse; reversed), and ‘Would you say that Britain’s
cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from
other countries?’ (1 = undermined, 7 = enriched). Higher scores indicate more
positive attitudes to immigration.
A principal component analysis (direct oblimin rotation with Kaiser normalization)
including all 18 items was run to confirm both the discriminant validity and internal
reliability of the four continuous variables. The pattern matrix revealed four factors with
Eigen factors greater than one corresponding to IMS, EMS, WD, and attitudes to
immigration. However, one item (‘According to my personal values, using stereotypes
about other people is OK’) was complex, loading primarily on IMS (.45) but also loading
on EMS (.37). Internal validity for IMS improvedwith this item removed (a = .83), so the
subsequent analysis used this 3-item scale. The revised 17-item model across the four
variables accounted for 69% of the total variance with all factor loadings greater than .66.
The four variables were discrete (all r2 < .18).
Additionally, we wished to control for key socio-demographic variables: age,
gender, level of education and political orientation. Participants confirmed their
highest level of education on a scale from 1 (‘no formal education’) to 7 (‘graduate
studies, e.g., MSc, PhD’). A dichotomous political orientation measure was constructed
based on participants’ vote in the 2017 UK General Election; those who voted for right-
leaning parties such as the Conservative or UK Independence Party (UKIP) were
classified as conservative, whilst those who voted for left-leaning parties (Labour,
Liberal Democrat, Green, Scottish National Party, and Plaid Cymru) were classified as
liberal.
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Results
Eight missing data values (Little’s MCAR, p = .301) across the measures of IMS, EMS, WD,
and attitudes to immigration were imputed using SPSS expectation–maximization (EM)
based on other items in the same measure. Nine participants who failed to give their age
were imputed with the mean age (39.8 years). Twelve outliers for IMS were transformed
to the next lowest non-outlier value (3.25). One multivariate outlier was retained1.
All but one of the 17 items used across the continuous variables displayed significant
non-normality (either skewness and/or kurtosis > 2.0 SD). At a variable level, only WD
was normally distributed. Transformations failed to correct these non-normal distribu-
tions, and bootstrapping was used whenever appropriate in subsequent analyses.
Bootstrapping is one way of accommodating non-normal data by taking multiple sub-
samples with replacement from the original sample (Byrne, 2009; Zhu, 1997).
Correlations and descriptive statistics for all variables are shown in Table 1.
Predictors of the EU referendum result
A hierarchical multiple regression was run with the EU referendum vote as the outcome
variable (see Table 2). The four socio-demographic control variables (age, gender, level of
education, and political orientation) were entered as predictor variables in model 1 with
IMS, EMS, WD, and attitudes to immigration added in model 2. Model 1 was significant,
F(4, 348) = 23.5, p < .001 R2 = .213, and accounted for 21% of the variance in the EU
referendum vote. Model 2was also significant, F(8, 344) = 38.4, p < .001,R2 = .472, and
accounted for 47% of the total variance in the EU referendum vote. The change between
model 1 and model 2 was significant, F(4, 344) = 42.1, p < .001, DR2 = .259; IMS, EMS,
WD, and attitudes to immigration explained an additional 26% of the variance over and
above the socio-demographic variables. Lower WD (b = .12, p = .005, sr2 = .11) and
more positive attitudes to immigration (b = .51, p < .001, sr2 = .40) both significantly
predicted a Remain vote. The direct effect of both IMS (b = .02, p = .72, sr2 = .01) and
EMS (b = .02, p = .72, sr2 = .01) on the EU referendum vote was not significant.
Validating the structural equation model
The path diagram shown in Figure 1 was evaluated using SPSS AMOS (version 23) with
maximum likelihood (ML) estimation. Latent variables for IMS, EMS, WD, and attitudes to
immigrationwere estimated based on the 17 items detailed in themethods section. To test
the hypothesized moderation of IMS on the effect of EMS on WD, an interaction variable
(IMS 9 EMS) was constructed by multiplying the standardized versions of IMS and EMS.
The error term of this interaction variable was allowed to co-vary with both IMS and EMS,
fromwhich it was derived. Age, gender, level of education, and political orientation were
included as controls. Given the non-normality of the data, bootstrapping (1,000 samples)
was used to assess the significance of the parameter estimates. West, Finch, and Curran
(1995) found that non-normal data in SEM analysesmay yield artificially high values of chi-
square and may underestimate goodness-of-fit indices such as CFI. Nevertheless, the
model was recursive and parsimonious (P-ratio = .79) and represented a good enough fit
1 To check that these data cleaning approaches had not unduly influenced the results, we repeated the principle analyses
removing those cases with missing data altogether (reducing the sample size to 338) and without adjusting the univariate outliers.
For both the hierarchical multiple regression and the structural equation model, this made minimal difference to the results.
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for the data; v2 (201, N = 353) = 439, p < .001, v2/DF = 2.19, GFI = .90, CFI = .93,
PCFI = .74, RMSEA = .058. No post-hoc modifications were incorporated. The model
with standardized coefficients is shown in Figure 2.
Overall, the model explained 48% of total variance in the EU referendum vote, 45% of
variance in attitudes to immigration, and 9% of variance in WD. Non-normal data in SEM
have been found to understate the standard errors (SE) of parameters resulting in inflated
p-values (West et al., 1995). However, even with more conservative bias-corrected
bootstrapped p-values, all the hypothesized effects remained significant (see Table 3).
Higher IMS (b = .42, p = .004), lower EMS (b = .21, p = .001), and lower WD
(b = .20, p = .001) predicted more positive attitudes to immigration. More positive
attitudes to immigration (b = .55, p = .002) and lower WD (b = .12, p = .014) both
predicted a Remain vote in the EU referendum. The interaction of IMS and EMS predicted
WD (b = .20, p = .004). The indirect effects of IMS (b = .23, LLCI = .16, ULCI = .30,
p = .003) and WD (b = .11, LLCI = .19, ULCI = .05, p = .004) on the referendum
vote were significant; higher IMS and lower WD predicted a Remain vote. Together with
the direct effect, the total effect of WD on the EU referendum vote was negative and
significant (b = .23,p = .002); lowerWDpredicted aRemain vote. The indirect effect of
EMS on the EU referendum vote was negative and significant (b = .12, LLCI = .19,
ULCI = .05, p = .001); lower EMS predicted a Remain vote. Removing the control
Figure 2. Structural equation model showing the effect of IMS, EMS,WD, and attitudes to immigration
on the EU referendum vote with age, gender, level of education, and political orientation as controls.
Notes. All coefficients standardized. Study 1 (N = 353) top number, not italicized; Study 2 (N = 363)
bottomnumber, bold italicized. IMS = internalmotivation to respondwithout prejudice. EMS = external
motivation to respond without prejudice. Will_disag = willingness to disagree. Att_Imm = attitudes to
immigration (higher score = more positive). EURef_vote = EU referendum vote (1 = Leave,
2 = Remain). Education = level of education. Pol_Orient = political orientation (1 = conservative/
right, 2 = liberal/left). Factor loadings for latent variables apply to Study 1. *p < .05, **p < .01,
***p = .001, n.s. = not significant (based on bootstrapped estimates).
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variables individually from the model made minimal difference to the model fit and, in
each case, still explained 47% of overall variance in the EU referendum vote. Excluding all
four control variables at the same time reduced the overall share of the variance explained
to 44%, with some deterioration in model fit compared with the full model; v2 (145,
N = 353) = 354, p < .001, v2/DF = 2.44, GFI = .90, CFI = .94, PCFI = .79,
RMSEA = .064.
To further explore the interaction of EMS and IMS on WD, a Preacher–Hayes model 1
(Process version 3.1; Hayes, 2018) was run with IMS as the moderating variable (95%
confidence interval, 1,000 bootstrap samples with age, gender, level of education, and
political orientation as covariates). This confirmed our hypothesis that IMS doesmoderate
the relationship between EMS andWD (binteraction = .13, p = .002). EMS had no effect on
WD for participantswithmean IMS (b = .07,p = .18) or high IMS (b = .08,p = .26). For
those with low IMS, however, WD decreased significantly as EMS increased (b = .22,
p = .002) as shown in Figure 3.
Additional exploratory analyses
Given the impact of the four control variables (age, gender, level of education, and
political orientation), representing 21% of total variance in the EU referendum result, we
conducted additional exploratory analyses with a view to incorporating these into the
structural equation model. All four socio-demographic variables were significant
predictors of the EU referendum vote (see Table 3). However, level of education
(b = .12, p = .004, sr2 = .11) and political orientation (b = .14, p = .001, sr2 = .13) had
the strongest impact; more educated and more liberal participants were more likely to
Table 2. Summary of hierarchical multiple regression analysis of variables predicting voting in the EU
referendum vote
Study 1 (N = 353) Study 2 (N = 363)
b sr2 F R2 DR2 b sr2 F R2 DR2
Age .05 .05 .14** .14
Gender .12* .12 .03 .03
Education .33*** .32 .19*** .18
Pol_Orient .25*** .24 .29*** .29
Model 1 23.5*** .21 – 18.2*** .17 –
Age .08* .08 .10* .10
Gender .10* .09 .04 .04
Education .12** .11 .04 .04
Pol_Orient .14** .13 .09* .08
IMS .02 .01 .05 .04
EMS .02 .01 .02 .02
WD .12** .11 .01 .01
Att_Imm .51*** .40 .55*** .40
Model 2 38.4*** .47 .26 34.0*** .43 .26
Notes. Att_Imm = attitudes to immigration, EMS = external motivation to respond without prejudice,
IMS = internal motivation to respondwithout prejudice, Pol_Orient = political orientation,WD = will-
ingness to disagree.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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vote Remain. Correlations also suggested that level of education and political orientation
might mediate the relationship between other predictor variables and the EU referendum
vote. A series of analyses using Preacher–Hayesmodel 4with age and gender as covariates
(95% confidence interval and 1,000 bootstrap samples; Hayes, 2018) confirmed several
significant mediations (see Table 4). The effect of education on the EU referendum vote
was mediated by IMS (R2 = .06, F = 8.0, p = <.001), WD (R2 = .04, F = 5.1, p = .002),
and attitudes to immigration (R2 = .15, F = 21.2, p = <.001). The effect of political
Table 3. Bias-corrected bootstrapped estimates for the hypothesized direct, moderated, andmediated
effects on the EU referendum vote
Parameter
Study 1(N = 353) Study 2 (N = 363)
SE b LLCI ULCI p SE b LLCI ULCI p
Direct effects
IMS ? Att_Imm .089 .42 .31 .52 .004 .096 .51 .39 .61 .003
EMS ? Att_Imm .087 .21 .33 .09 .001 .088 .15 .26 .04 .007
WD ? Att_Imm .134 .20 .33 .09 .001 .133 .12 .25 .01 .070
Att_Imm ? EURef_vote .016 .55 .45 .63 .002 .015 .61 .52 .69 .003
WD ? EURef_vote .030 .12 .21 .03 .014 .030 .01 .09 .11 .900
Moderated effects
IMS 9 EMS ? WD .043 .20 .07 .32 .004 .053 .08 .06 .21 .287
Mediated effects
IMS ? EURef_vote .018 .23 .16 .30 .003 .021 .31 .23 .39 .002
EMS ? EURef_vote .015 .12 .19 .05 .001 .018 .09 .17 .02 .007
WD ? EURef_vote .024 .11 .19 .05 .001 .025 .07 .15 .004 .062
Notes. Att_Imm = attitudes to immigration, EMS = external motivation to respond without prejudice,
EURef_vote = EU referendum vote, IMS = internal motivation to respond without prejudice,
WD = willingness to disagree.
Figure 3. Mean willingness to disagree (scale 1–7) at low (1 SD), mean, and high (+1 SD) levels of
internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice.
Notes. IMS = internalmotivation to respondwithout prejudice (scale 1–7). EMS = externalmotivation to
respond without prejudice (scale 1–7).
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orientation on the EU referendumvotewasmediated by IMS (R2 = .04,F = 5.0,p = .002),
EMS (R2 = .04, F = 5.3, p = .001), and attitudes to immigration (R2 = .07, F = 9.3,
p = <.001).
Incorporating these mediations into the structural equation model, the direct paths
from IMS (b = .02, p = .87) and EMS (b = .001, p = .94) to the EU referendum vote
remained non-significant and were excluded. The percentage of total variance in the EU
referendum vote explained by the revised SEM increased slightly to 49%. Whilst the
revised model was more complex, the P-ratio (.80) was similar and fit indices were only
slightly worse than the original hypothesized model; v2 (202, N = 353) = 470, p < .001,
v2/DF = 2.33, GFI = .90, CFI = .92, PCFI = .74, RMSEA = .061. A simplified version of
the revised model with standardized coefficients and bias-corrected bootstrapped prob-
abilities is shown in Figure 4.
Discussion
Study 1 supported all our hypotheses. Positive attitudes to immigration and lower WD
directly predicted a Remain vote in the UK 2016 EU referendum. Indirectly, mediated by
attitudes to immigration, higher IMS and lower EMS also predicted a Remain vote. EMS
positively predicted WD, but only at lower levels of IMS. A structural equation model
reflecting these relationships (with age, gender, education, and political orientation as
covariates) explained 48% of the EU referendum result.
STUDY 2
The primary purpose of Study 2 was to conduct a complete replication of Study 1
confirming the goodness of fit both to the original model and to the revised model which
included two of the control variables, education and political orientation. Second, we
wished to explore how our measure of WD related to an existing measure of PC. Strauts
and Blanton (2015) developed the concern for political correctness (CPC) scale with two
subscales. The emotion subscale (PC-E) measured the emotional reaction to non-PC
Table 4. Study 1: exploratorymediations between level of education and political orientation on the EU
referendum vote with age and gender as covariates
Mediator
Total model Direct effect Indirect effect
R2 F p b p b LLCI ULCI
Level of education ? EU referendum vote
IMS .064 8.02 <.001 .577 <.001 .132 .070 .220
EMS .019 2.22 .086 .647 <.001 .023 .004 .059
WD .042 5.12 .002 .624 <.001 .065 .021 .130
Att_Imm .154 21.25 <.001 .430 .001 .548 .387 .786
Political orientation ? EU referendum vote
IMS .041 5.00 .002 .983 <.001 .270 .101 .511
EMS .043 5.28 .001 1.07 <.001 .088 .009 .206
WD .017 2.03 .11 1.24 <.001 .007 .103 .133
Att_Imm .074 9.33 <.001 .719 .004 .889 .529 1.385
Notes. Att_Imm = attitudes to immigration, EMS = external motivation to respond without prejudice,
IMS = internal motivation to respond without prejudice, WD = willingness to disagree.
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language, whilst the activism subscale (PC-A) measured propensity to confront non-PC
language. WD, originally intended as a surrogate measure of PC, is a unipolar scale such
that highWD implies resistance to politically correct pressure. The CPC is also a unipolar
scale, such that high PC implies adherence to politically correct norms. It was possible
that these two scales simply reflected opposite ends of the same construct. Finally, we
wished to test whether the CPC produced a better fit if it replaced WD in the model.
Methods
The study was pre-registered: https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=9ei3ys
Participants
Participants were recruited during 19-21 August 2019 exclusively through Prolific. Of the
398 participants who did the survey, 29 were excluded because they did not vote in
the 2016 EU referendum. Six entries were duplicated; their first submission was retained.
The final sample was 363 (267 women; 96 men) of whom 172 voted Leave and 191 voted
Figure 4. Simplified path diagram of a revised structural equation model showing the effect of level of
education, political orientation, IMS, EMS,WD, and attitudes to immigration on the EU referendum vote
with age and gender as controls.
Notes. All coefficients standardized. Study 1 (N = 353) top number, not italicized; Study 2 (N = 363)
bottomnumber, bold italicized. IMS = internalmotivation to respondwithout prejudice. EMS = external
motivation to respond without prejudice. Att_Imm = attitudes to immigration (higher score = more
positive). EURef_vote = EU referendum vote (1 = Leave, 2 = Remain). Education = level of education.
Pol_Orient = political orientation (1 = conservative/right, 2 = liberal/left). *p < .05, **p < .01,
***p = .001, n.s. = not significant (based on bias-corrected bootstrapped estimates).
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remain. Age ranged from 21 to 67 years (M = 35.7, SD = 11.1; minimum age was 21
below which participants would not have been eligible to vote in the 2016 EU
referendum).
Design
As for Study 1, thiswas a correlational designwith the EU referendumvote as the outcome
variable, IMS, EMS, WD, and attitudes to immigration as predictor variables, and age,
gender, education, and political orientation as covariates.
Procedure and materials
Procedure andmaterials were exactly as for Study 1, except for the inclusion of ameasure
of PC.
Measures
All measures were as for Study 1: IMS (3 items, a = .85), EMS (4 items, a = .73), WD (4
items, a = .77), and attitudes to immigration (6 items, a = .91).
Additionally, we included all nine items (a = .95) from the concern for PC scale
(Strauts & Blanton, 2015): four items from the emotional subscale (a = .92; e.g., ‘I feel
angrywhen a person says something politically incorrect’) and five items from the activist
subscale (a = .94; e.g., ‘when a person uses politically incorrect words, I point it out to
them and help educate them about the issues’) on 7-point Likert scales (1 = extremely
disagree; 7 = extremely agree). Higher scores imply greater PC.Whilst we had concerns
about this measure (see the introduction), it was the best extant measure of PC.
Results
Thirteen missing data values (Little’s MCAR, p = .98) across the continuous measures
were imputed using SPSS expectation–maximization. Two outliers for IMS were
transformed to the next lowest non-outlier value (2.33). Four multivariate outliers were
retained. Whilst EMS andWDwere approximately normally distributed, IMS, attitudes to
immigration, and CPC all showed skewness and/or kurtosis greater than two standard
deviations. All statistical analyses exactly replicated those used in Study 1unless otherwise
stated.
Correlations and descriptive statistics for all variables are shown in Table 5.
Predictors of the EU referendum result
A hierarchical multiple regression confirmed that IMS, EMS, WD, and attitudes to
immigration explained an additional 26% of the variance over and above the control
variables (age, gender, education, and political orientation); F(4, 354) = 41.5, p < .001,
DR2 = .26. Together with the control variables, the overall model explained 43% of the
total variance in the EU referendum vote (c.f. 47% in Study 1), F(8, 354) = 34.0, p < .001,
R2 = .43 (see Table 2). As in Study 1, more positive attitudes to immigration (b = .55,
p < .001, sr2 = .40) significantly predicted a Remain vote and the effect of both IMS
(b = .05, p = .37, sr2 = .04) and EMS (b = .02, p = .65, sr2 = .02) on the EU
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referendum vote was not significant. Unlike Study 1, however, the effect ofWD on the EU
referendum vote (b = .01, p = .92, sr2 = .01) was not significant.
Validating the structural equation model
A replication of the original structural equationmodel resulted in levels of fitwith the data
that were only marginally inferior to Study 1, but still acceptable, v2 (201,
N = 363) = 471, p < .001, v2/DF = 2.35, GFI = .90, CFI = .92, PCFI = .73,
RMSEA = .061, and accounted for 46% of the EU referendum result (c.f. 48% in Study 1;
see Figure 2). However, three paths that were significant in Study 1 ceased to be
significant in Study 2 (see Table 3). First, the interaction between IMS and EMS did not
predict WD (b = .08, p = .29). Second, there was no direct effect of WD on the EU
referendum vote (b = .01, p = .90). Finally, there was no direct effect of WD on attitudes
to immigration (b = .12, p = .07) and the indirect effect of WD on the EU referendum
vote was also non-significant (b = .04, LLCI = .10, ULCI = .003, p = .07).
We also replicated the revised version of the model (with education and political
orientation included in the model itself, rather than as control variables). Once again,
model fit was only slightly worse than Study 1, v2 (202, N = 363) = 490, p < .001, v2/
DF = 2.43, GFI = .89, CFI = .92, PCFI = .73, RMSEA = .063, and accounted for 45% of
the EU referendum result (c.f. 49% in Study 1; see Figure 4).
Political correctness, willingness to disagree, and motivation to respond without
prejudice
Participants who scored highly on the 9-item CPC scale were more likely to be younger
(r = .11, p = .04), more highly educated (r = .25, p < .001), politically left-wing
(r = .25, p < .001), and female (r = .18, p = .001). CPC correlated positively with IMS
(r = .54, p < .001) and attitudes to immigration (r = .59, p < .001), and negatively with
EMS (r = .14, p = .01) and WD (r = .23, p <.001).
A principal component analysis (direct oblimin rotation with Kaiser normalization)
revealed that all nine items of the CPC loaded onto only one factor, which suggested that
the emotional and activist subscales identified by Strauts and Blanton (2015) were not
discrete. A further principal component analysiswas run including all 20 items across IMS,
EMS, WD, and CPC. This revealed four factors with eigenvalues greater than one which
exactly corresponded to the four variables, with all loadings greater than .61 and no cross-
loadings greater than .32. Once again, the nine items of the CPC all loaded onto the same
factor and did not separate the two subscales.
Replacing WD with the 9-item CPC in the hierarchical multiple regression made
minimal difference to the result; the totalmodel explained 44%of the total EU referendum
result, F(8,354) = 34.0, p < .001, R2 = .44. Consistent with WD in Study 2, CPC did not
have a significant effect on the EU referendum vote (b = .03, p = .64, sr2 = .02).
ReplacingWDwith the 9-itemCPC in the original structural equationmodelmaterially
impaired the fit to the data, v2 (321, N = 363) = 1,092, p < .001, v2/DF = 3.40,
GFI = .79, CFI = .87, PCFI = .74, RMSEA = .081, but still accounted for 44% of variance
in the EU referendumvote. ConsistentwithWD, the interaction between IMS and EMS did
not significantly predict CPC (b = .07,p = .18) and therewas no significant direct effect
of CPC on the EU referendum vote (b = .01, p = .79). However, unlike WD, the direct
effect of CPC on attitudes to immigration (b = .38, p < .001) was significant as was the
indirect effect of CPC on the EU referendum (b = .23; LLCI = .16, ULCI = .34, p = .001).
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Discussion
Study 2 confirmed the key proximal influence of attitudes to immigration in the EU
referendum result and the indirect effects of IMS and EMS. However, WD ceased to have
any direct or indirect effect on the EU referendum result, although the indirect effect
(b = .07, p = .06) was only marginally non-significant even when using the more
conservative bias-corrected bootstrap estimate. The moderating effect of IMS on the
relationship between EMS and WD also ceased to be significant. Nevertheless,
the structural equation model had acceptable fit with the data and still explained 46%
of the EU referendum result.
The additional measure of political correctness (CPC; Strauts & Blanton, 2015) was
discrete from WD, IMS, and EMS. The hierarchical multiple regression explained slightly
more of the EU referendum vote with CPC instead of WD, although CPC itself did not
significantly predict the result. However, goodness of fit declinedwhenCPC replacedWD
in the structural equation model.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Across two correlational studies, we explored the roles of motivation to respond without
prejudice, willingness to disagree, and attitudes to immigration in the UK’s vote to leave
the EU. Our results are largely compatible with and complementary to the previous
psychological research on the Brexit result and underscored the central role of
immigration in the EU referendum vote. Meleady et al. (2017) showed that positive
contact with immigrants predicted pro-immigrant prejudice which in turn predicted an
intention to vote Remain. Van de Vyver, Leite, Abrams, and Palmer (2018) showed that a
dangerous worldview and conservatism predicted voting in the referendum,mediated by
perceived intergroup threat from (European) immigrants. Golec de Zavala et al. (2017)
showed that the perceived threat from immigrants mediated relationships between
collective narcissism, RWA and SDO, respectively, with the EU referendum vote. Whilst
previous research emphasized the role of various measures of prejudice on the Brexit
vote, our results reflected the influence of motivation to respond without prejudice.
The current research supports Plant and Devine’s (1998) assertion that IMS and EMS
were discrete. This contrasted with Dunton and Fazio (1997) who identified two very
similar constructs, Concernwith Acting Prejudiced and Restraint to AvoidDispute, which
were subscales of a single Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions scale. In our
research, both Study 1 (r = .06, p = .14) and Study 2 (r = .16, p = .002) found a small
inverse relationship between IMS and EMS, consistent with that found originally by Plant
and Devine (1998; r = .14). Plant and Devine (2001, 2009) showed that EMS and IMS
generated very different affective, attitudinal, and behavioural responses. People with a
high IMSwere likely to maintain an active commitment to live up to those non-prejudicial
values (Monteith, 1993; Plant &Devine, 2009) thatmay ultimately lead to the reduction or
elimination of implicit prejudice (Monteith, Sherman, &Devine, 1998). Conversely, those
with high EMS (and low IMS) had little interest in changing their prejudicial attitudes and
were primarily concerned with avoiding any social sanction (Crandall, Eshleman, &
O’Brien, 2002; Plant & Devine, 2009).
This inverse relationship between IMS and EMS was evident in the Brexit vote. Our
finding that high IMS predicted a Remain vote is consistent with Blinder et al.’s (2013)
conclusion that motivation to respond without prejudice was an important variable in
political choices where outgroups (such as immigrants) were prominent. However, both
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our studies also highlighted the independent effect of EMS.Whilst not as great as IMS, EMS
had a significant and opposite influence on the EU referendum; higher EMS predicted a
vote to leave.
Blinder et al. (2013) also suggested that anti-immigrant political choices were
consistently mitigated when the anti-prejudice norm was made more salient. Arguably,
the high-profile accusations during the EU referendum campaign that Leave supporters
were racist (Durrheim et al., 2018; Gidda, 2016; ITV News, 2016) did make the anti-
prejudice norm salient. However, the effect may have been to polarize voter opinion,
reinforcing pro-immigrant views amongst Remainers and anti-immigrant sentiment
amongst Leavers. Given a strong anti-prejudice norm in Britain (Blinder et al., 2013; Ford,
2008), the accusation of racism by some Remain supporters might be construed as an
attempt to apply normative pressure (Moscovici, 1976) on Leave sympathizers by
stigmatizing the issue of immigration. However, the effort required to hide prejudice may
fuel frustration and resentment (Monteith, Spicer, & Tooman, 1998) and provoke a
backlash that further exacerbates prejudicial views (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Legault,
Gutsell, & Inzlicht, 2011; Wyer, 2007). Although the current research did not test this
hypothesis, it seems plausible that such a backlash may have been reflected in the vote to
leave the EU.
We also explored the role of PC in the EU referendum vote. In a series of three
experiments (Plant&Devine, 2001), participantswith low IMS andhigh EMS experienced
a dissonance between their internal views and the requirement to hide these externally.
They expressed frustration when faced with politically correct pressure, responded
defensively, exhibited more prejudicial attitudes, and reacted with more defiant
behaviour. Such an effect may have been at play in the 2016 US presidential election;
Conway et al. (2017) demonstrated that priming moderate voters with politically correct
stimuli increased support for Donald Trump. In Study 1, we found a significant effect of
willingness to disagree with such politically correct pressure, both directly on the EU
referendum result and indirectly via attitudes to immigration; thosewith a lowwillingness
to disagree were more likely to vote Remain.
Finally, we tested a further iteration of our original hypothesized model by
incorporating two of the initial control variables into the main path model. This revealed
the mechanisms whereby education and political orientation influenced the EU
referendum result. Greater education predicted a Remain vote, mediated by more
positive attitudes to immigration, higher IMS, and lower WD. A liberal/left-wing political
orientation predicted a Remain vote mediated by more positive attitudes to immigration,
higher IMS, and lower EMS.Whilst the fit of the datawas not as good for this revisedmodel
compared with the original, it still explained 49% of the variance in Study 1 and 45% in
Study 2.
Limitations and future research directions
Whilst the current research involved two large and broadly based samples, they were not
fully representative of the UK population. Theyweremore female, more highly educated,
and politically more left-wing. However, therewas no evidence of systematic bias and key
socio-demographic variableswere controlled for in the analysis. Therewere discrepancies
in someof the results,most notably over the role ofWD,which showed a significant direct
and indirect effect on the EU referendum in Study 1 but failed to do so in Study 2.
Additionally, our hypothesis that IMS would moderate the effect of EMS on WD was
supported in Study 1 but not in Study 2. Nevertheless, our model showed good enough fit
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with the data in both studies. It should be stressed that these were correlational studies.
Whilst we believe that the hypothesized model is plausible and consistent with existing
theory, no experimental tests were employed to validate the direction of causality.
There is a lack of consensus on PC as a construct in the psychological literature. Past
researchers have conceptualized PC variously as a presentation management device
(Barker, 1994), as a process of self-censorship (Suedfeld et al., 1994) and as an emotional
reaction to, or willingness to confront prejudicial behaviour (Strauts & Blanton, 2015).
Lalonde et al. (2000) identified two opposing groups that they called PC ‘crusaders’ and
PC ‘bashers’. Andary-Brophy (2015) drew adistinction betweenpolitically correct beliefs,
motivated by political ideology, and politically correct language, motivated largely by a
concern for impression management. Dickson (2017) described PC as an ‘ism’ (similar to
sexism or racism) composed of cognitions, affect, and behaviours. Given its prominence
in the Brexit debate, andmore broadly in political dialogue in the United Kingdom and the
United States, PC deserves greater investigation as a psychological construct.
The current research measured willingness to disagree (WD), originally intended as a
surrogate for PC. In Study 2, we compared WDwith the concern for political correctness
scale (CPC; Strauts & Blanton, 2015) to test whether these two measures might reflect
opposite poles of the same construct. Whilst WD and CPC are inversely correlated
(r = .23, p < .001), a principal component analysis showed that they are discrete.
Subsequent to our fieldwork, a more recent study (Smith & Percy, 2019) has used an
adapted version of the CPC, which included six items each for high PC and low PC.
Nevertheless, the Smith and Percy (2019) measure still refers explicitly to PC raising the
potential for a social desirability bias. There remains a need to develop a measure of PC
that is both robust and pragmatic.
More broadly, the current research cannot pretend to give a comprehensive
explanation of the EU referendum result. Our findings represent a complementary
perspective to the other social psychology research so far published, but future research
might explore how the various psychological variables now associated with the EU
referendum result might be integrated into a single overall theoretical picture. To date,
social psychologists have focused on the immigration aspect of the Brexit result, to the
exclusion of the economic dimension. The current divide between economic/demo-
graphic explanations of Brexit on the one hand and cultural/psychological explanations
on the other seems artificial. More interdisciplinary research would help to give a full
account of the causes of Brexit.
Finally, future researchmight usefully explore the post-Brexit psychological landscape
in the United Kingdom. The result seems to have exposed a highly divided society
(Corbett, 2018; Hobolt, 2016) underpinned by powerful negative stereotypes between
Leavers and Remainers. This seems to have become a battle of different worldviews:
inward looking versus outward looking, neo-liberal versus neo-conservative, globalism
versus xenophobia, metropolitan versus rural, and educated versus less educated. These
divisions may prove highly corrosive of social cohesion and political debate. Applied
social and political psychology should address the growing gulf within UK society, and
suggest means of repairing it.
Conclusions
The current research identified motivation to respond without prejudice as a key, but
indirect, determinant of the UK’s referendum vote in June 2016 to leave the EU (Brexit).
Immigration was a highly emotive issue during the referendum campaign, with Remain
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voters accusing Leavers of racism and Leave voters accusing Remainers of stifling free
speech. Remainers had higher internal motivation, borne out of personal commitment, to
respond without prejudice. Leave voters, by contrast, had higher external motivation to
respond without prejudice, reflecting a desire to avoid social disapproval. We also
explored the role of PC in the Brexit result. In Study 1, those voterswith a highwillingness
to resist politically correct pressure were more likely to vote Leave. Our results suggested
a backlash amongst some voters, who feel that PC has ‘gone too far’, that may have
reinforced the Leave vote. In a society where the anti-prejudice norm has become
prevalent, motivation to respond without prejudice may determine key political choices
such as Brexit.
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